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We examine how much of the observed wage dispersion among similar workers can 
be explained as a consequence of a lack of coordination among employers. To do this, 
we construct a directed search model with homogenous workers but where firms can 
create either good or bad jobs, aimed at either employed or unemployed workers. 
Workers in our model can also sell their labor to the highest bidder. The stationary 
equilibrium has both technology dispersion – different wages due to different job 
qualities, and contract dispersion – different wages due to different market 
experiences for workers. The equilibrium is also constrained-efficient – in stark 
contrast to undirected search models with technology dispersion. We then calibrate 
the model to the US economy and show that the implied dispersion measures are quite 
close to those in the data.  
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  It has long been established that a large proportion of wage disparity cannot be 
explained by differences in the observed characteristics of workers. In fact, in the 
empirical labor literature, it is generally agreed that approximately two thirds of wage 
dispersion is “residual” – it occurs within narrowly defined groups of workers. (See, 
for example, Katz and Autor (1999).) This has always posed a challenge to theory – 
particularly in the light of Diamond’s (1971) critique of wage dispersion, in 
equilibrium, with homogeneous workers. For this reason, several researchers have 
attributed this dispersion to “unobserved heterogeneity” among workers, with the 
implication that finer observations could ultimately resolve the issue.  
 
  Search theorists, on the other hand, have sought to explain this phenomenon as 
an equilibrium outcome with workers who are, in fact, homogeneous. Burdett and 
Judd (1983), for example, explore two variants of search that allow for equilibrium 
dispersion: non-sequential search and “noisy sequential search”. Both variants, 
however, rely on ex post worker heterogeneity in order to support the result. More 
recently, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) argue that, in the presence of on-the-job 
search and Poisson arrival rates, dispersion must occur in equilibrium. Their model 
has a continuous distribution of wage offers in equilibrium, for homogenous workers. 
This result is sensitive to some of the underlying assumptions, however. For example, 
it is important that they assume that incumbent firms cannot respond by adjusting 
wages when being raided by other firms.
1 It is also not clear how this result would 
change if arrival rates were not parametric but, instead, determined by the choices of 
agents in the model.  
 
  Another strand of search theory has emerged recently, which focuses precisely 
on this issue of where buyers would choose to search, when guided by some 
information about sellers. This has come to be known as “directed search” theory. 
Following Montgomery (1991), in most directed search models, the search friction is 
motivated by a simple coordination problem in the presence of capacity constraints.
2 
Sellers are capacity-constrained, in any period, by the fact that they have a fixed 
                                                 
1 Coles (2001) considers cases where their result is robust to changes in this assumption. 
2 Not all directed search papers  model this as a coordination problem. See, for example, Moen (1997).   2
number of objects to sell. Buyers, even when aware of the locations and prices of all 
the sellers, face a friction if they all move simultaneously: too many buyers may 
arrive at any one seller. If this seller has fewer units of the good to sell than demanded 
by the buyers, some buyers will be unable to purchase the good. At the same time, 
there may be other sellers that have too few buyers approach them, so some of the 
good may be left unsold. Thus, in the face of this coordination problem, some buyers 
and some sellers may end up frustrated even if the number of units for sale (in the 
aggregate) is the same as the number of units that buyers would like to purchase. In 
these models, the only symmetric equilibrium is one in which all buyers randomize 
when choosing which seller to approach. This randomization implies an endogenous 
matching function that resembles, in several important ways, the function used in the 
matching literature (for example, Pissarides (2000)).  
 
  This basic structure has been explored recently in several papers. Within it, 
three different sources of equilibrium wage dispersion among homogenous workers 
have been identified. Julien, Kennes, and King (2000) show that, when workers 
auction their labor, since some workers will receive more bidders than others, some 
workers will enjoy higher wages than others. Thus, wages can differ simply due to the 
randomization inherent in the coordination problem. We will refer to this type of 
dispersion here as “contract dispersion”. Secondly, as shown in Acemoglu and 
Shimer (2000), if different jobs have different productivities, this can lead to 
homogeneous workers being paid differently in different jobs. We will refer to this as 
“technology dispersion”.
3  The third source of wage dispersion, explored in Burdett, 
Shi and Wright (2001) and Shi (2001a) comes from the fact that prices charged will, 
in general, be a function of the severity of the capacity constraint. This draws on 
Peters’ (1984) insight that, in capacity-constrained settings, buyers face a trade-off 
between prices and probability of sale. We can think of this as “capacity dispersion”.  
 
  The concept of capacity dispersion forces us to think about which types of 
agents are on which side of the market and what, exactly, is being sold in the labor 
market. Acemoglu and Shimer (2000), Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) and Shi 
(2001a,b) follow the tradition in search theory where firms act as sellers – selling jobs 
                                                 
3 Acemoglu and Shimer’s  (2000) model also has the added friction of non-sequential search: workers 
cannot see posted wages unless they pay a cost to receive a sample of them.    3
to workers. In Julien, Kennes, and King (2000), we model workers as being in the 
more traditional role as sellers in this market. While it seems reasonable to consider 
that capacity dispersion may play a major role when different sizes of firms sell jobs, 




  In this paper we argue that a large proportion of the observed “residual” wage 
dispersion can be explained as a consequence of the basic coordination problem that 
underlies these directed search models. To do this, we construct the simplest possible 
model of this type, in which endogenous contract and technology dispersion are 
obtained in equilibrium. We model workers as sellers of labor, and allow firms to 
create vacancies of different types: high and low productivity (with different 
associated costs). The setup is significantly simpler than in Acemoglu and Shimer’s 
(2000) paper, largely because we do not have the added complication of non-
sequential search.
5 This allows us to derive explicit solutions for the endogenous 
variables. It also allows us to isolate the effects of the coordination problem alone.  
 
  We start by first examining the properties of a static model, and derive 
necessary and sufficient conditions for technology dispersion to exist in equilibrium, 
when firms are free to enter and choose their technologies. We then extend the model 
to a dynamic (infinite horizon) environment which allows for search, both on and off 
the job, and separations. We solve for values of the endogenous variables in the 
stationary equilibrium, and show that this equilibrium is constrained-efficient. 
Parameter values are then chosen so that the model matches the mean weekly wage 
and unemployment rate of the US economy in 1995. Key statistics of the numerical 
wage distribution generated by the model are then compared with those from 
empirical studies. Among the results, we find that the standard deviation of the log of 
these wages is approximately 54% of the figure given, in the Katz and Autor (1999) 
study, for the entire wage distribution in 1995. Perhaps more strikingly, when 
considering the 90-10 percentiles of the log wage distribution, the model predicts a 
figure of 1.08, which is quite close to the approximate 1.15 figure reported, by Katz 
and Autor, for “residual” wage dispersion in that year.  
                                                 
4 In Julien, Kennes, and King (2001), we provide a more detailed comparison of these frameworks. 
5 Another key difference is that we allow for firm entry here, rather than fixing the number of firms.    4
The constrained-efficiency result is consistent with similar results in the 
directed search literature with homogeneity (for example: Moen (1997) and Julien, 
Kennes and King (2000)). However, it stands in stark contrast with those in the 
“undirected search” literature. For example, Sargent and Ljungquist (2000) conclude:
6 
 
“In the case of heterogeneous jobs in the same labor market with 
a single matching function we establish the impossibility of 
efficiency without government intervention.” 
 
  This is clearly a case where the implications of direct and undirected search 
theory differ substantially. The assumption that matching probabilities are unaffected 
by behaviour, inherent in undirected search, leads to a congestion that distorts the 
welfare properties of the equilibrium. When agents can choose matching probabilities, 
this distortion is removed.  
  
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents and analyses the static 
model. Section 2 then presents the structure of the dynamic model. Section 3 presents 
analytical results concerning the stationary equilibrium. The quantitative analysis of 
the model is presented in Section 4. The conclusions of the study are given in Section 
5, along with a general discussion. The proofs of all the propositions in the paper are 
contained in the Appendix.  
 
 
                                                 
6 Acemoglu (2001) and Davis (2001) reach similar conclusions.   5
1.  THE STATIC MODEL 
 
  Consider a simple economy with a large number N of identical, risk neutral, 
job candidates where each candidate has one indivisible unit of labor to sell. There are 
N M i i φ =  vacancies of two types:  } 2 , 1 { ∈ i , where  0 ≥ i φ , and are determined by free 
entry. The productivity of a worker is  0 0 = y  if unemployed and  0 > i y  if employed 
in a job of type i, where  1 2 y y > . It costs  i k  to create a vacancy, where  1 2 k k >  and 
0 ≥ ≥ i i k y   i ∀ . Each vacancy can approach only one candidate. The order of play is 
as follows. Given N,  i M  vacancies of each type i enter the market. Once the number 
of entrants has been established, vacancies choose which candidate to approach. Once 
vacancies have been assigned to candidates, wages are determined through an 
ascending-bid (English) auction.




  Each worker conducts an ascending-bid auction, where his reserve wage is 
simply his outside option  0 0 = y . In equilibrium, the wage 
j
i w  of a worker who is 
employed in a job of productivity i, and who had a second best offer from a job of 
productivity j is given by: 
 
                                                                  j
j
i y w =                                                    (1.1) 
 
for all  } 2 , 1 { ∈ i  and  } 2 , 1 , 0 { ∈ j .  
 
The Assignment of Vacancies to Workers 
 
  As is standard in directed search environments,
8 when considering the location 
choice of buyers, attention is restricted to the unique symmetric mixed strategy 
equilibrium in which each buyer of each type randomizes over sellers. Consequently, 
                                                 
7  We justify the usage of an auction in this type of environment in Julien, Kennes, and King (2001). 
The form of auction is irrelevant, since revenue equivalence holds here. See, for example, McAfee and 
McMillan (1987).  
8 See, for example, Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) and Shi (2001a,b).    6
in a large market, the probability  i p  that a worker is approached by a vacancy of 
maximum productivity  i y  is given by: 
 



























pi                                        (1.2) 
 
It also follows that, in a large market, from the pool of vacant jobs of productivity  i y , 
a candidate obtains either (i) no offer, (ii) one offer, and (iii) multiple offers with 
probabilities 
i e




i i e e i
φ φ φ
− − − − 1 , respectively. Therefore, the probability 
distribution of wages is given by: 
 
























































































































i p  denotes the probability that worker obtains a wage 
j
i w .  
 
If the numbers of vacancies were given exogenously (i.e.,  1 φ  and  2 φ  were 
parameters) then (1.3) would represent the final solution of the model. Examining 
(1.3), it is clear that wage dispersion has two sources: contract dispersion and 
productivity dispersion. For example, the difference in the wages  1
1
1 y w =  and  0
0
1 = w  
is due entirely to contract dispersion: in both cases, the productivity of the job is low, 
but workers who earn 
1
1 w  had an outside offer from another low productivity job 
whereas workers who earn 
0
1 w  did not. In order to receive the highest wage  2
2
2 y w = , 
workers need to be on the right end of both contract and productivity dispersion: the 
presence of at least one high productivity vacancy is required to make this wage 
technically feasible, and the presence of at least one other high productivity vacancy, 
as an outside offer is required to make this wage an equilibrium outcome. It is also   7
clear that contract dispersion can be at least as important to workers as productivity 
dispersion. For example, a worker in a high productivity job earns a wage equal to 
0
0
2 = w  with probability 
0
2 p  while a worker in low productivity job earns a higher 
wage of  1
1
1 y w =  with probability 
1
1 p . Both of these probabilities are positive if 




The profit of a firm is equal to its output minus its vacancy creation cost and 
the wage it pays to the worker. Therefore, the profit 
j
i π  of a vacant job of 
productivity  i y  that makes an offer to a worker who has a best rival offer of 
productivity  j y  is given by: 
 
                                                    i j i
j
i k y y − − = } 0 , max{ π                                       (1.4) 
 
The expected profit  i π  of a vacant job of productivity  i y  is given by: 
 
                                                      } 0 , max{ 1 1
0
1 1 k y q − = π                                         (1.5) 
 








i q  is the probability that a firm earns a profit equal to 
j
i π . The probability that 
a vacant job does not face offer competition from a rival job of productivity  i y  is 
given by 
i e





φ φ − − = = e e q q  is the probability that the vacant job does 
not face a rival vacant job of either productivity, and 
2 1) 1 (
1
2
φ φ − − − = e e q  is the 
probability that a vacant job faces a low productivity rival but not a high productivity 
rival. The supply of vacant jobs of productivity  i y  is determined by free entry, so the 
expected profit  i π  of a vacant job of productivity  i y  is equal to zero in equilibrium: 
 
                                                           0 2 1 = = π π                                                      (1.7)   8
 
  The assumption that the output of a particular type of job is greater than the 
cost of the job vacancy does not guarantee that the supply of jobs of that type is 
positive. (For example, it is easy to see that  1 1
0
1 k y q −  can be negative if  2 φ  is 
sufficiently large – making 
0
1 q  sufficiently small.) Therefore we do not know, based 
on our present assumptions, whether or not the two different jobs will exist in 
equilibrium. The following proposition presents necessary and sufficient conditions 
for this type of productivity dispersion. 
 
Proposition 1:Both types of jobs exist in equilibrium ( 0 > i φ    i ∀ )if and only if the 
following conditions hold: 
 
1 1 2 2 k y k y − > −               and             2 2 1 1 / / k y k y > . 
 
  Moreover, when these conditions hold, then the equilibrium values of 
1 φ  and  2 φ  are given by: 
 
                                       )) /( ) ln(( ) / ln( 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 k k y y k y − − − = φ                              (1.8) 
 
                                                )) /( ) ln(( 1 2 1 2 2 k k y y − − = φ                                        (1.9) 
 
The first condition in Proposition 1 ensures that the supply of high 
productivity jobs is always positive if the output of a good job net of its capital cost 
exceeds the output of a bad job net of its capital cost. The second condition implies 
that the supply of low productivity jobs is always positive if the output of a bad job 
per unit of capital is greater than the output of a good job per unit of capital. These 
two conditions are satisfied by the simple assumption of a diminishing marginal 
product of capital.  
 
Under these conditions, equations (1.3), (1.7), (1.8), and (1.9) completely 
solve for the equilibrium payoff structure in the static model. 
   9
Constrained Efficiency 
 
  We now consider the problem of a social planner that is able to control entry, 
but still faces the same coordination friction as private agents. The planner chooses 
0 1 ≥ φ  and  0 2 ≥ φ  to maximize total expected surplus S: 
 
} ) 1 ( ) 1 {( max 2 2 1 1 1 2 ,
1 2 2
2 1
k k y e e y e N S φ φ
φ φ φ
φ φ − − − + − =
− − −  
 
Proposition 2:  The decentralized equilibrium is constrained efficient. 
 
  The reasoning behind the efficiency result is as follows. Consider the choice 
of whether or not to add one more low quality vacancy. With some probability, the 
employer with this new vacancy will approach a candidate that is also approached by 
some other vacancy, (of either of high or low quality). In this case, if this other 
vacancy is also low quality, then with some probability, the entering vacancy will hire 
the worker, so the gains to the match with the other employer will be lost. This is an 
external cost associated with the new vacancy. However, there is also a benefit 
created: the match of the entering vacancy and the worker. Clearly, this cost and this 
benefit exactly cancel each other. Thus, the social return from such a new vacancy is 
zero. Due to the auction mechanism, this is precisely the private return that a new low 
quality vacancy gets in this case.  
 
If, however, the other vacancy is of high quality, then, again, the social value 
of the entering low quality vacancy is zero and the payoff will be zero, though the 
auction mechanism. If the entering low quality vacancy approaches a worker whom 
otherwise would not be matched, then a social benefit is generated: the value of the 
match  1 y . The expected marginal social benefit of the new vacancy is therefore the 
probability that the new vacancy will be alone when it approaches a worker, 
multiplied by  1 y . The marginal social cost of generating a new vacancy is simply the 
cost of creating the vacancy  1 k . A social planner equates these two, and so does a 
private entrant.  
   10
  A similar line of reasoning holds for the creation of a new high quality 
vacancy. In this case, however, if the other vacancy is of low quality, then the new 
high quality vacancy will hire the worker with probability one. Here, the gains to the 
match with the other vacancy  1 y will be lost, but the gains to the new match will be 
2 y , so the net social gains are  ) ( 1 2 y y − . Once again, through the auction mechanism, 
this is precisely the private return that a new high quality vacancy receives. In all 
cases the private and social returns are equated.  
 
  It is also worthwhile to note that the role of the worker as seller is crucial here. 
In a similar model, but where firms play the role of seller of jobs, Jansen (1999) 
shows that only one type of job can exist in equilibrium. 
 
2.  THE DYNAMIC MODEL 
 
There is large number, N, of identical risk neutral workers facing an infinite 
horizon, perfect capital markets, and a common discount factor 0 > β . In each time 
period, each worker has one indivisible unit of labor to sell. At the start of each period 
,... 3 , 2 , 1 , 0 = t , there exist  t E0  unemployed workers, of productivity  0 0 = y , and  it E  
workers in jobs of productivity  0 > i y  where } 2 , 1 { ∈ i . Also, at the beginning of each 
period, there exist  ) ( 2 1 t t t i it E E N M − − = φ  vacant jobs of each productivity type 
directed at unemployed workers and  t t t E M 1 2 2 ˆ ˆ φ =  high productivity vacant jobs 
directed at employed workers in jobs of productivity  1 y .
9 In each period a vacant job 
has a capital cost of  i k  such that  j i y y ≥  and  j i k k ≥   ∀   j i ≥ . Also, any match in 
any period may dissolve in the subsequent period with fixed probability ). 1 , 0 ( ∈ ρ  In 
each period, any vacant job can enter negotiations with at most one worker.  
 
  Within each period, the order of play is as follows. At the beginning of the 
period, given the state, new vacancies enter. Once the number of entrants has been 
established, vacancies choose which workers to approach. Once new vacancies have 
been assigned to candidates, wages are determined through the auction mechanism.  
                                                 




Let  it Λ  denote the expected discounted value of a match between an 
unemployed worker and a job of productivity  i y  at the start of any period. Through 
the auction, the workers share 
j
it W  of the expected discounted value  it Λ  is equal to 
the expected discounted value  jt Λ  of a match between the worker and the worker’s 
second best available job offer: 
 
                                                          jt
j
it W Λ =                                                          (2.1) 
 
The Assignment of Vacancies to Workers 
 
Unemployed workers advertise auctions with a reserve price of  t 0 Λ  while 
workers in low productivity jobs advertise auctions with a reserve price of  t 1 Λ . The 
workers are distinguishable only by their employment state. As in the static model, we 
restrict attention to the unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which each 
vacancy randomises over each relevant group of workers. Consequently, the new 
hires of  t H 2  high productivity workers and  t H1  low productivity workers are given 
respectively by: 
 
                                              t t t t t t p E p E E N H 2 1 2 2 1 2 ˆ ) ( + − − =                                (2.2) 
 
                                              t t t t t t p E p E E N H 2 1 1 2 1 1 ˆ ) ( − − − =                                 (2.3) 
 
where  ) 1 (
2
2
t e p t
φ − − = , 
t t e e p t
2 1 ) 1 ( 1
φ φ − − − =  and  ) 1 ( ˆ
ˆ
2
t e p t
φ − − = . The fraction  ρ  of 
all jobs dissolve in the next period, therefore, the supply of worker of each type 
evolves according to the following transition equations: 
 
                                              ) )( 1 ( 1 it it it H E E + − = + ρ   } 2 , 1 { ∈ i                      (2.4) 
   12
The randomness of job offers implies that a worker can obtain either one, multiple or 
no job offers from vacancies of either type. Therefore, it follows that the expected 
present value of an unmatched worker satisfies: 
 












0 ) ( ) ( Λ + Λ + + Λ + + =                   (2.5) 
 
where 
t te e p p p t t t t t







φ φ φ φ
− − + + = + +  is the probability that a worker has one 
or fewer offers,  ) 1 ( ) 1 (






t t t t t e e e e e p p t t t t
φ φ φ φ φ φ φ
− − − − − − + − − = +  is the 
probability of multiple offers only one of which is possibly good, and 










The expected profit  it Π  of a job of productivity  i y  making an offer to an 
unemployed worker satisfies: 
 
                                          } 0 , ) max{( 1 0 1 1
2 1 k e e
t t
t t t − Λ − Λ = Π
− − φ φ                            (2.6) 
 
                } 0 , ) 1 )( ( ) max{( 2 1 2 0 2 2
2 2 1 k e e e e
t tt t t
t t t t t − − Λ − Λ + Λ − Λ = Π




2 φ φ − −  is the probability that a low or high productivity job does not face a 
rival, and 
t t e e
2 1 ) 1 (
φ φ − − −  is the probability that a high productivity job faces only a low 
productivity rival. The expected profit of an offer by a high productivity to a worker 
in a low productivity job is given by: 
 






t t t − Λ − Λ = Π




2 ˆ φ −  is the probability that high productivity job does not face a competing 
offer from a rival high productivity job. The supply of vacant jobs of productivity  i y  
is determined by free entry. Thus 
   13
                                                         0 ˆ
2 2 1 = Π = Π = Π t t t                                          (2.9) 
 
The value of an unmatched worker in the next period determines the outside option of 
an unmatched worker in the current period, so 
 
                                                             1 0 + = Λ t t V β                                                  (2.10) 
The total surplus of a high productivity job is equal to the output of a high 
productivity job plus the discounted future flow of income from such a job weighted 
by the probability of an exogenous job separation into unemployment: 
 
                  ... ] ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ 2 2
2
2 1 2 2 + − + − + − + + = Λ + + y V y V y t t t ρ ρ ρ β ρ ρ β     (2.11) 
 
Wages in low productivity jobs are bargained with the understanding that the 
worker will get the increase of surplus associated with any potential favourable future 
bargain between the worker and a high productivity job during the worker's tenure at 
a low productivity job. Therefore, the expected present value of being a worker in a 
low productivity job must incorporate the probability of moving into a higher paying 
(high productivity) job in a subsequent period. Hence 
 
... ) ) 1 ( )( 1 ( ˆ ) ) 1 ( ( 2 1
2 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 + − + − + − + + = Λ + + + + + t t t t t t X V p X V y ρ ρ ρ β ρ ρ β  (2.12) 
 






1 t t t t t p p y p X Λ + Λ + =  summarizes three possible outcomes: 
t e p t
2 ˆ 1
1 ˆ
φ − =  
is the probability that the employed worker is not recruited, 






− = , is the 
probability that the employed worker is recruited by one good job, and 
t t e e p t t
2 2 ˆ ˆ
2
2
2 ˆ 1 ˆ
φ φ φ
− − − − =  is the probability that the worker is recruited by one or more 
high productivity jobs. 
 
  In this paper we will, for the most part, restrict our attention to the stationary 
equilibrium. However, the following proposition establishes that certain values are 
stationary in any equilibrium of this model. 
   14
Proposition 3: The equilibrium values of { t 1 φ , t 2 φ , t 2 ˆ φ , t 1 Π , t 2 Π , t 2 ˆ Π , t V , t 0 Λ t 1 Λ t 2 Λ }, 
denoted by { 1 φ , 2 φ , 2 ˆ φ ,  1 Π ,  2 Π  , 2 ˆ Π ,V ,  0 Λ , 1 Λ , 2 Λ }, are stationary. 
 
For the remainder of the paper, we restrict our attention to the stationary equilibrium. 
 
3.  THE STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM 
 
  The following propositions characterize some of the important features of the 
stationary equilibrium. The first concerns the fractions of the workforce that are 
assigned, at the end of every period, to the different types of jobs. 
 
Proposition 4: In the stationary equilibrium, the fraction  i n  of workers in each 
productivity state  i y  is given by: 
                                                       
0
0






=                                               (3.1) 
 
                                                 
2
1 0
1 ˆ ) 1 (








=                                       (3.2) 
 
                                                            0 1 2 1 n n n − − =                                                (3.3) 
 
where the  i p ’s are given by equation (1.2) and  ) 1 ( ˆ
2 ˆ
2
φ − − = e p . 
 
Notice that the stationary structure allows us to use some of the results 
developed in Section 1, which considers the static model. The next proposition 
establishes a sufficient condition for on-the-job search to exist in equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 5:  Vacant good jobs are directed at workers employed in bad jobs if 
2 1 2 )) 1 ( 1 ( ) ( k y y ρ β − − > − , in which case the supply of these jobs 
is determined by: 
 




1 2 2 ) ˆ )( 1 ( ) (
2 2 2 k e e e y y k
φ φ φ φ ρ β
− − − + − + − =                      (3.4)   15
 
This condition ensures that good jobs will open up in response to the existence 
of bad jobs. In particular, it ensures that firms will recruit workers in bad jobs. 
However, it does not ensure that good job vacancies will be opened up in head to head 
competition with bad jobs in the recruitment of unemployed workers.  In other words, 
we still have to determine whether  2 φ  is strictly positive. It also does not address the 
existence of bad jobs in equilibrium. These two concerns are considered in the 
following two propositions. 
 
Proposition 6: Unemployed workers receive more good offers on average than 
workers in bad jobs. The supply of good jobs aimed at unemployed 
workers is determined by: 
 




1 2 ) (
φ φ − − = − e k e k k                                              (3.5) 
 
where  2 1 2 ) ( k k k < −  implies 2 2 ˆ φ φ > . 
 




Proposition 7: An equilibrium with  2 2 1 ˆ , , φ φ φ >0 exists. The supply of bad jobs in this 
equilibrium is determined by: 
 
                                        ( )
2 1 ) ˆ )( 1 ( 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
φ φ φ φ φ ρ β
− − − + − + = e e k k k y k                     (3.6) 
 
and the supply of good jobs is determined by equations (3.4) and 
(3.5). 
 
  Equations (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6) determine the stationary equilibrium values of 
1 φ ,  2 φ , and  2 ˆ φ . (That is, they determine the numbers of vacancies of the different 
types in equilibrium.) Computationally, the system is recursive: (3.4) determines  2 ˆ φ ,   16
then (3.5) determines  2 φ , then (3.6) solves for  1 φ . While simple analytical solutions 
are not available, it is straightforward to compute these values numerically, for any 
given vector of parameters ( ρ β , , , , , 2 1 2 1 k k y y ) that satisfies the restriction in 
Proposition 5. Before proceeding to the numerical analysis, however, it is useful to 
draw out some more analytical results.  
 
Proposition 8: The expected values of workers in the different states are given by: 
 
                          ( )
β
ρ β φ φ φ
φ φ
−




)) 1 ( 1 )( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 2 ˆ
2 2 2 1 1 2 e e k k y
V             (3.7) 
 
                                                                 V β = Λ 0                                                    (3.8) 
 
                                                        








                                             (3.9) 
 
                                     
) ˆ )( 1 ( 1















Λ − − − + +
= Λ
e e
e e V y                   (3.10) 
 With  1 φ ,  2 φ , and  2 ˆ φ  determined in equations (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6), the values 
of , , , 1 0 Λ Λ V  and  2 Λ  can now be determined by the equations in Proposition 8. Once 
again, this is a recursive system , with V determined in (3.7), then  0 Λ  and  2 Λ  
determined in equations (3.8) and (3.9). With V  and  2 Λ  determined, (3.10) 
determines  1 Λ .  
 
We can now solve for the period wages in the stationary equilibrium. These 
are determined by: 
 
                                                                   0
0
0 = w                                                   (3.11) 
 









           } 2 , 1 , 0 { ∈ j          (3.12) 
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                                       j
j
e e
e e V w
Λ =
+ − −
Λ − − − + +
− −
− −
) ˆ )( 1 ( 1
















i w  denotes the wage per period of a worker in state 
j
i W . The following 
proposition now presents the entire wage distribution in the stationary equilibrium.  
 






0 = w  
) ) ˆ 1 )( ( )( 1 (
2 ˆ
2 0 2 2 0
0
1
φ φ ρ β βρ
− + Λ − Λ − Λ − − − Λ = e V w  
1
1
1 y w =  
V w βρ ρ β − Λ − − = 0
0
2 )) 1 ( 1 (  
V w βρ ρ β − Λ − − = 1
1
2 )) 1 ( 1 ( 
2
2
2 y w =  
 
Fraction of workforce earning each wage 
0
0
0 n n =  










1 n n n − =  
2 1 ] / ) 1 ( 1 [ 0
0
2
φ φ ρ ρ
− − − + = e e n n  
ρ ρ φ φ ρ ρ
φ φ φ / ) 1 ( ˆ ) 1 ( ] / ) 1 ( 1 [
2 1 2 ˆ
2 1 2 0
1
2 − + − − + =






2 n n n n − − =  
 
  
  Given the parameters ( ρ β , , , , , 2 1 2 1 k k y y ) and equations (3.1)-(3.10), the 
equations in Proposition 9 determine the wage structure in the stationary equilibrium. 
At this point, it is useful to compare this structure with that of the static model (given   18




0 w w  and 
2
2 w  are the same in the two models. While the 
reasoning why  0
0
0 = w  is straightforward in both models, 
1
1 w  and 
2
2 w  may need some 
explanation. The key is that, in each period, the expected value of profits for the each 
firm is driven down to zero. If two (or more) vacancies of the same type (but none of 
the other type) land at the doorstep of the same worker, any chance of a positive ex 
post profit for these firms disappears. The cost they paid to generate the vacancy, is 
already sunk. They are, in effect, just like firms in the static game. The value of 
holding the job open into the next period is zero. As in the static game, Bertrand 
competition between the two identical firms drives the current payoff to zero. The 
value of 
1
2 w  is also determined, as in the static model, by the surplus associated with a 
low quality job. 
 
  Unlike the value of firms, the value of workers is not driven to zero in the 
dynamic model. Whereas, in the static model, each worker’s outside option is zero; in 
the dynamic model, an unemployed worker’s outside option is  0 0 > Λ . If a worker 
receives only one low quality vacancy, the auction mechanism determines that this 
worker will receive exactly his outside option. The value of 
0
1 w  in Proposition 9 is 
simply the period wage consistent with that. The determination of 
0
2 w  is entirely 
analogous.  
 
Before turning to the numerical analysis of this model, we first consider, once 
again, the question of constrained efficiency, where the social planner chooses to 





− − − + + + =
0
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
} , , , , , {
} ˆ ) ( ) ( { max
2 1 1 2 1 2
t
t t t t t t t
t
M M H H E E
M k M k M k H E y H E y S
t t t t t t
β  
 
subject to equations (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4). 
 
Proposition 10:  The stationary equilibrium is constrained-efficient. 
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4. QUANTITATIVE  ANALYSIS 
 
  There are six parameters in this model: ( ρ β , , , , , 2 1 2 1 k k y y ). To assess the 
quantitative significance of the dispersion in this theory, as our baseline, we picked 
parameter values to approximate the US economy in 1995. We chose this year for two 
reasons. First, this theory abstracts from any cyclical features, and is essentially a 
theory of an economy that is performing well – the only friction being the basic 
coordination problem. Arguably, this was the case in the US at that time. Second, 
1995 is the last year considered in Katz and Autor’s (1999) study, which presents 




  The Katz and Autor (1999) study analyses weekly data. With an annual 
discount rate of 5%, this implies a weekly discount factor of β = 0.999. Using Kuhn 
and Sweetman’s (1998) estimate of a 4% monthly separation rate, we set the weekly 
01 . 0 = ρ . To focus on an equilibrium with on-the-job search, given the values of 
β and ρ , we restricted our choices of  1 2 1 , , k y y  and  2 k  to satisfy the condition stated 
in Proposition 5.  We set  150 1 = y , which is at the lower end of the observed 
distribution. We chose the values of  1 2,k y  and  2 k  to match the average weekly wage 
in 1982 dollars ($255), the “natural” rate of unemployment (3.9%) and the vacancy 
rate 2.6%





                                                 
10 The actual unemployment rate in 1995 was 5.6%. We chose 3.9% as our approximate target for the 
unemployment rate because the unemployment rate settled down to that number in subsequent years, 
and this theory is really a theory of the natural rate. The 2.6% figure for the vacancy rate was 
extrapolated from Blanchard and Diamond (1989), using labor force figures from the BLS and the 
vacancy index from the Conference Board. 
11 The values of  1 k  and  2 k  may seem quite high, when considering weekly costs. However, we have 
modelled this so that these costs terminate once a vacancy is filled – and vacancies are filled quite 
quickly in equilibrium. In reality, there fixed costs when creating jobs, and these can be quite large 
when considering the capital that is used to match with a worker. Following Pissarides (2000), to keep 
the state vector as small as possible, we model these costs as flow costs.    20
  Table 4.1, below, presents the equilibrium wage distribution, for this set of 
parameters.  
 
Equilibrium Wage Distribution 
                     Wages                              Fraction of Workforce 
                      0
0
0 = w                                         0393 . 0
0
0 = n  
                    11 . 127
0
1 = w                                    0967 . 0
0
1 = n  
                    150
1
1 = w                                        0075 . 0
1
1 = n  
                    31 . 231
0
2 = w                                  2812 . 0
0
2 = n  
                    83 . 251
1
2 = w                                   5501 . 0
1
2 = n  
                    3 . 1131
2
2 = w                                   0252 . 0
2




It is quite clear from this table that both productivity dispersion and contract 
dispersion play important roles in wage determination. For example, among workers 
that receive only one job offer, those that receive this offer from a high productivity 
vacancy receive a wage of  31 . 231
0
2 = w , while those that receive the offer from a low 
productivity vacancy receive only  11 . 127
0
1 = w . This difference is due entirely to 
productivity dispersion. However, among those workers that take jobs with high 
productivity vacancies, those that had no other offer receive  31 . 231
0
2 = w , those 
whose second-best offer came from a low-productivity vacancy receive  83 . 251
1
2 = w , 
while those whose second-best offer came from another high productivity vacancy 
receive 3 . 1131
2
2 = w . The difference of these three wages is driven purely by contract 
dispersion.  
 
  Table 4.1 also shows that, in the stationary equilibrium, most workers are in 
good jobs. Adding 
0
1 n  and 
1
1 n , we can see that only 10.42% of workers are in bad 
jobs. Altogether, 85.65% of workers are in good jobs. However, very few (2.52%) are   21
paid the top wage of  3 . 1131
2
2 = w . Due to contract dispersion, 28.12% earn only 
31 . 231
0
2 = w , while 55.01% earn  83 . 251
1
2 = w . This leaves 3.93% unemployed.  
 
 
  Table 4.2 shows the stationary equilibrium values of some of the other key 
variables. 
 
Other Key Variables in Equilibrium 
Good Vacancies Aimed at Workers in Bad Jobs             0516 . 0 ˆ
2 = φ  
Good Vacancies Aimed at Unemployed Workers           0715 . 0 2 = φ  
Bad Vacancies Aimed at Unemployed Workers             1471 . 0 1 = φ  
Value of Unemployed Worker                                        649 , 233 0 = Λ  
Value of a Bad Job Match                                               515 , 235 1 = Λ  




  From this table, it can be seen that the probability of a worker receiving a good 
job offer, when unemployed (
2 1
φ − − e = 0.069) is higher than the receiving one when 
already employed in a bad job (
2 ˆ
1
φ − − e = 0.0503). This occurs because of the extra 
bargaining power a worker in a bad job has: if successfully recruited, he must be paid 
83 . 251
1
2 = w , rather the wage  31 . 231
0
2 = w  paid to a worker that was previously 
unemployed. Overall, the probability of a worker leaving a current job to take another 
(0.0503) one is approximately one quarter the probability of a currently unemployed 
worker finding a job (
2 1 1
φ φ − − − e e  = 0.1964). Rephrasing this, in equilibrium, the 
“offer arrival rate” for unemployed workers is significantly higher than the “offer 
arrival rate” of employed workers. This is something that has been observed 




                                                 
12 See, for example, Pissarides (1994).   22
  From Tables 4.1 and 4.2, another feature of the equilibrium can be seen. 
Although the vacancy/unemployment ratios for good and bad jobs are quite similar in 
magnitude, in the stationary equilibrium, the vast majority of workers are in good 
jobs. On-the-job-search is significant enough to drive this result. Workers in bad jobs 
know that they will not stay there for very long. This is also reflected in the fact that 
the ratio  34 . 1 / 1 2 = Λ Λ  is significantly smaller than the value of  54 . 7 / 1 2 = y y . The 
values of the matches include all expected returns to both the firm and the worker. 
Thus, as can be seen from equation (3.10), the value of  1 Λ  takes into account the fact 
that the worker will, most likely, move on to a good job in the future.  
 
  The next table, Table 4.3, compares some of the statistics from this example 
with those from US data. 
 
Comparing Statistics 
  Statistic                                            Model                        US Data 
Mean Wage                                        255.55                         255.00 
Standard Deviation Log Wage            0.327                          0.616 
90%-10% Log Wage                           1.08                         1.54 (1.15) 
Unemployment Rate                           3.93                             5.6 (3.9) 




  The values of the parameters were chosen so that the mean wage, the 
unemployment rate, and the vacancy rate were close to those in the data. The mean 
weekly wage for males in the US was approximately $255 in 1995. The 
unemployment rate 5.6% overall, with an estimated natural rate of 3.9%. The 
corresponding figures from the model are $255.55 and 3.93%. Katz and Autor report 
that the standard deviation of the log wage in the US overall in 1995 was 0.616. In the 
model, the corresponding figure is 0.327 – approximately 53% of the figure in the 
data. Thus, one could argue that 53% of this observed dispersion was due to the 
coordination problem, which results in both productivity dispersion and contract 
dispersion among workers that are effectively homogeneous. This result is reinforced   23
by another statistic reported by Katz and Autor. They report the differences of the 90
th 
and 10
th percentiles of the log wage distribution, both overall and for the “residual” 
wage distribution. In the US, overall, in 1995, this figure was approximately 1.54 
overall and 1.15 for the residual distribution. In the model, this figure is 1.08. Thus, 
by this measure, this simple model can explain a large proportion of the residual wage 
dispersion.  
 
  We can also use this model for local comparative static exercises – comparing 
the equilibrium outcomes across stationary equilibria with different parameter values. 
The following table presents the results from this exercise, for small perturbations 
around the parameters in the above base case.  
 
   1 y   1 k   2 y   2 k   β   ρ  
 
2 ˆ φ     -  0  +  -  +  - 
2 φ       -  + + -  + - 
1 φ       +  - - +  - + 
V       + -  + -  + - 
0 Λ       + -  + -  + - 
1 Λ       + -  + -  + - 
2 Λ       + -  + -  + - 
0
1 w       + -  -  + + - 
1
1 w       + 0 0 0 0 0 
0
2 w       + + + -  + - 
1
2 w       + 0 + -  + - 
2
2 w       0 0 + 0 0 0 
0
0 n       -  + + -  + + 
0
1 n       + + -  + -  + 
1
1 n       +  - - +  - + 
0
2 n       -  + + -  + - 
1
2 n       +  - - - - - 
2
2 n       -  + + -  + - 
w       + + + -  + - 
w log σ       -  + + -  + - 
10 log 90 log −     -  + + -  + - 
 
Table 4.4:  Comparative Statics 
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  Most of the signs in this table are quite intuitive. Two that are not immediately 
obvious are  0 / 2
0
0 > ∂ ∂ y n  and  0 / 2
0
0 < ∂ ∂ k n . That is, the unemployment rate is a 
decreasing function of the productivity, and an increasing function of the cost, of a 
good job. This is understandable, however, when observing that it is also the case that 
0 / 2
0
1 < ∂ ∂ y n , 0 / 2
1
1 < ∂ ∂ y n  and  0 / 2
0
1 > ∂ ∂ k n , 0 / 2
1
1 > ∂ ∂ k n . In this case higher 
values of  2 y , and lower values of the cost  2 k , while increasing the number of good 




  Another interesting feature that comes out in this table is that higher values of 
the separation rate  ρ  lead to higher unemployment rates, but less dispersion. This 
leads to a reduction in the expected present value of the stream of future payoffs, 
which affects the expected return from good jobs disproportionately since they have 
higher costs to be paid up-front. This reduces the number of good jobs, and the wage 
in good jobs, while encouraging the entry of bad jobs. Overall, unemployment goes 
up, due to the large direct effect of separations on unemployment. However, 
dispersion is reduced by the diminished relative value of good jobs. This offers an 
alternative explanation for the negative correlation observed between these variables, 





  From this analysis, it appears that a large proportion of the observed wage 
disparity among similar workers can be seen as a direct consequence of the lack of 
coordination among employers. When each employer chooses, independently, the 
quality of a job and the candidate to offer it to, then the theory predicts that we will 
observe both contract dispersion and technology dispersion. In the absence of this 
coordination problem, all employers would choose the same type of job, and would 
pay the same wage to identical workers. Quantitatively, when calibrating the model to 
match observed mean wages and unemployment rates, we found that, despite its   25
simplicity, it can come remarkably close replicating the dispersion statistics that have 
been calculated, in independent studies, for US data.  
 
  We also found that the equilibrium allocations are constrained-efficient in the 
sense that a planner could do no better unless able to eliminate the coordination 
problem, (and hence, the matching friction). In particular, the policies advocated in 
(for example) Acemoglu (2001), which influence the relative composition of good 
and bad jobs without reducing the matching frictions, would only hurt here. This is an 
example of how conclusions can be quite different in models with directed and 
undirected search. 
 
  One appealing feature of this model is that the measures of dispersion are 
unaffected by simple scaling up of the productivities and costs. Future work, 
therefore, could imbed this model into a framework with asset accumulation and 




   26
APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
 
Using (1.5)-(1.7), the expected profits of the two types of vacancies are: 
0 1 1 1
2 1 = − =
− − k y e e
φ φ π  and  0 ) )( 1 ( 2 1 2 2 2
1 2 2 1 = − − − + =
− − − − k y y e e y e e
φ φ φ φ π . Solving 
these simultaneously yields (1.8) and (1.9). It is easily shown that  0 , 2 1 > φ φ  iff 
1 1 2 2 k y k y − > −  and  2 2 1 1 / / k y k y > .  ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2:   
 
An interior maximum of the social planning problem satisfies  1 1
2 1 y e e k
φ φ − − =  and 
) )( 1 ( 1 2 2 2
1 2 2 1 y y e e y e e k − − + =
− − − − φ φ φ φ which is the same as the decentralised 
economy. It follows from the proof of Proposition 1 that  1 1 2 2 k y k y − ≥ −  and 
1 1 2 2 / / k y k y ≥  imply  0 , 2 1 ≥ φ φ .  ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
 
In a stationary equilibrium the values of { t 1 φ , t 2 φ , t 2 ˆ φ , t 1 Π , t 2 Π ,  t 2 ˆ Π , t V , t 0 Λ t 1 Λ t 2 Λ } 
are given by 
 
(A.1)  
2 2 1 ) 1 )( ( ) 1 )( ( 2 1 2 2 1 0 1 2
φ φ φ φ φ φ
− − − + Λ − Λ − + + Λ − Λ − Λ = e e e V  
(A.2)   } 0 , ) max{( 1 0 1 1
2 k e e
t − Λ − Λ = Π
− − φ φ  
(A.3)   } 0 , ) 1 )( ( ) max{( 2 1 2 0 2 2
2 1 2 1 k e e e e − − Λ − Λ + Λ − Λ = Π
− − − − φ φ φ φ  




2 k e − Λ − Λ = Π
− φ  
(A,5)   0 1 = Π  
(A.6)   0 2 = Π  
(A.7)   0 ˆ
2 = Π  
(A.8)   V β = Λ 0  
(A.9)  










) ˆ )( 1 ( 1















Λ − − − + +
= Λ
e e
e e V y  
 
We have 10 independent equations for the 10 proposed stationary variables. The 
parameters {β , 1 y , 2 y , 1 k , 2 k ,ρ } of these equations are constant. Moreover, all of 
these equations are independent of the potentially non-stationary state 
variables t E1 , t E2 , t M1  etc.. Therefore, { t 1 φ , t 2 φ , t 2 ˆ φ , t 1 Π , t 2 Π ,  t 2 ˆ Π , t V , t 0 Λ t 1 Λ t 2 Λ } are 
stationary in equilibrium.  ■ 
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Proof of Proposition 4:  
 
In a stationary equilibrium, equations (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) imply  
 
(i)  2 1 2 2 1 2 ˆ ) ( p E p E E N H + − − =  
(ii)  2 1 1 2 1 1 ˆ ) ( p E p E E N H − − − =  
(iii) ) 1 )( ( ρ − + = i i i H E E } 2 , 1 { ∈ ∀ i  
 
Note:   (a)  (iii)  implies    ρ ) ( i i i H E H + =   } 2 , 1 { ∈ ∀ i  
  (b)  definition:  N H E n i i i / ) ( + =   } 2 , 1 { ∈ ∀ i  
  (c)  identity:    2 1 0 1 n n n − − =  
 
We can rewrite (i) and (ii) as follows. 
 
(i’)  2 1 2 2 1 2 ˆ ) 1 ( )) 1 )( ( 1 ( p n p n n n ρ ρ ρ − + − + − =  
(ii’)  2 1 1 2 1 1 ˆ ) 1 ( )) 1 )( ( 1 ( p n p n n n ρ ρ ρ − − − + − =  
 
Note that (i’) plus (ii’) implies 
 
(iv) ) ))( 1 )( ( 1 ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 2 1 p p n n n n + − + − = + ρ ρ    or  
 
) ))( 1 )( 1 ( 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 1 0 0 p p n n + − − − = − ρ ρ  

















1 ) 1 (
)] 1 )( 1 ( 1 [
p
p n






Finally, by the identity 
 
(vii)  1 0 2 1 n n n − − =   ■ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
 




) ˆ )( 1 ( 1
2 2 ˆ ˆ
2
1 2
1 2 φ φ φ ρ β
− − + − −
−





Equation (A.4) and  2 ˆ φ >0 imply    28
 
(A.12)   2 1 2
ˆ
) ( k e = Λ − Λ
− φ  
 
Equations (A.11) and (A.12) yield equation (3.4). It is easy to see from equation (3.4) 
that  2 ˆ φ  is always positive if  2 1 2 )) 1 ( 1 ( ) ( k y y ρ β − − > − .  ■ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 6:  
 
On-the-job search implies that 0 ˆ , 2 1 > φ φ . Therefore, equations (A.2) and (A.3) imply  
 
(A.13)   2 1 2
ˆ
) (
2 k e = Λ − Λ
− φ  
 
(A.14)   1 0 1
2 1 ) ( k e e = Λ − Λ
− − φ φ  
 
Equations (A.9), (A.13) and (A.14) can be used to eliminate  2 Λ ,  2 Λ - 1 Λ  and  1 Λ - 0 Λ  
from equation (A.1). The appropriate substitutions yield 
 
(A.15)   [ ]
β
ρ β φ φ φ
φ φ
−




)) 1 ( 1 )( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 2 ˆ
2 2 2 1 1 2 e e k k y
V . 
 
Equations (A.9) and (A.8) imply that the difference  2 Λ - 0 Λ  is given by 
 
(A.16)  
) 1 ( 1
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2








In an equilibrium with good jobs aimed at unemployed workers it must be the case 
that  
 
(A.17)   2 1 2 0 2
2 1 2 1 ) 1 )( ( ) ( k e e e e = − Λ − Λ + Λ − Λ
− − − − φ φ φ φ  
 
Substitute (A.15) and (A.16). Then substitute this expression and (A.11) into (A.17). 
This yields equation (3.5).  ■ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 7: 
 
Equations (A.10) and (A.8) imply that the difference between  1 Λ  and  0 Λ  is as 
follows: 
 
A.18)       
) 1 ( 1
) 1 )( 1 (
) 1 ( 1
) ˆ 1 )( 1 (





























= Λ − Λ
− −
− −
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If we assume that  0 ˆ , 2 1 > φ φ , we can substitute (A.15) into (A.18) to get an expression 
for  1 Λ - 0 Λ in terms of  2 2 1 ˆ , , φ φ φ . This expression can be substituted into equation 
(A.14) to yield (3.6). Therefore, an equilibrium with  2 2 1 ˆ , , φ φ φ >0 is characterised by 
equations (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6). According to Propositions 1 and 2, we know that 
2 2 ˆ ,φ φ >0 are determined by equations (3.4) and (3.5) and that both values are positive 
if  2 1 2 )) 1 ( 1 ( ) ( k y y ρ β − − > − . We can then substitute these values into equation (3.6) 
to check whether  1 φ >0.  ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 8: 
 
Follows directly from the equations derived in Propositions 4 through 7.  ■ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 9: 
 
The values of 
j













2 ˆ ) ( p E p E E N H + − − =  
(iii)  
2
2 1 2 2 1
2
2 ˆ ) ( p E p E E N H + − − =  
(iv)   ρ ) ( 2 2 2
i i i H E H + =      } 2 , 1 , 0 { ∈ ∀ i  
(v)   N H E n
i i i / ) ( 2 2 2 + =      } 2 , 1 , 0 { ∈ ∀ i  
 
Note that (iv) also implies ) 1 )( ( 2 2 2 ρ − + =
i i i H E E } 2 , 1 , 0 { ∈ ∀ i . Recalling the proof of 

















2 ˆ ) 1 ( ) 1 ( p n p n p n n ρ ρ ρ − + + − =  












2 1 ] / ) 1 ( 1 [ 0
0
2
φ φ ρ ρ
− − − + = e e n n  
ρ ρ φ φ ρ ρ
φ φ φ / ) 1 ( ˆ ) 1 ( ] / ) 1 ( 1 [
2 1 2 ˆ
2 1 2 0
1
2 − + − − + =






2 n n n n − − = .  ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 10 
 
There are two types of high productivity vacancies -  t M 2  and  t M 2 ˆ . Therefore, it is 
actually convenient to distinguish (i) the workers that moved into good jobs from 
unemployment and (ii) the workers that moved into good jobs from bad jobs. Define 
 
(B.1)   t t t E E E 2 2 2
~ ˆ + =   } 2 , 1 { ∈ i     30
Like wise  t t t H H H 2 2 2
~ ˆ + = ,  } 2 , 1 { ∈ i . In which case, the social planning problem can 
be stated as follows: 
 











 + − − + + + + + =
0









~ ˆ ( ) ( )
~ ˆ ~ ˆ ( { max
2 2 1
2 2 1 2 2 1 t
t t t t t t t t t
t
M M M
H H H E E E
M M k M k H E y H H E E y S
t t t









2 2 1 2
t e E E E N H t t t t
φ − − − − − =  
(B.4)   ) 1 ( ˆ 2 ˆ
1 2
t e E H t t
φ − − =  
(B.5)   ) 1 ( ) 1 )(
~ ˆ (
ˆ
1 2 2 1 1
2 1 t t t e E e e E E E N H t t t t t
φ φ φ − − − − − − − − − =  
(B.6)   ) )( 1 ( 1 1 1 1 t t t H E E + − = + ρ  




2 2 1 2 t t t H E E + − = + ρ  
(B.8)   ) ˆ ˆ )( 1 ( ˆ
2 2 1 2 t t t H E E + − = + ρ  
 
where ) ˆ ~
( 2 2 1 1 1 t t t t t E E E N M − − − = φ , ) ˆ ~
( 2 2 1 2 2 t t t t t E E E N M − − − = φ  and  t t t E M 1 2 2 ˆ ˆ φ = . 





E E E N










− − − −
=
+ − ρ φ  
 


















t E E E N
E
E E N
E E E N
M
− − − −
−







Likewise (B.5) and (B.6) imply 
 







ˆ ~ 2 1






































− + − = =


































1 2 1 2
2
~ ˆ , , ~ ˆ , ) 1 (
) ~ ˆ (
) 1 (
{ max ) (
1 2 1 2 1 2 2
t t t






t t t t t t ρ ρ
 







− − − − − −
−
− − − −




ln( ) ˆ ~
( 2 1 2 2 1
1 2
2 1 2 2 t t t t t
t
t t t E E E N E E
E




















2 1 1 2 t
t
t t t E
E










ln( ) ˆ ~ (
1 2
2 1
1 2 1 1 1 2







− − − −
−
+ +
− − − −
















>  2 1 1 2 2 2 )
~
( ' k k k E V t t t + + = φ φ  
< t E2 ˆ >  2 1 1 1
ˆ
2 2 2 2 2
1 2 2 ) ˆ ( ' k e k k e k e k k E V
t t t
t t t + + + + − =
φ φ φ φ φ  
< t E1 > 




2 2 2 2 2 2 1 ˆ ) ( '
φ φ φ φ φ φ + + + − − =  
< 1 2
~
+ t E > )
~
( ' ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 0 1 2 1 2 1
2 2 2
+ − + − + − = t E V e e k e k y
t ρ β
φ φ φ  
< 1 2 ˆ




+ − + − − = t E V e e k e k y ρ β
φ φ φ  
< 1 1 + t E >  ) ( ' ) 1 ( 0 1 1 1 1
2 1
+ − + − = t E V e e k y ρ β
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This system of equations can be solved for the steady state values of  2 1 1 , ˆ , φ φ φ . The 
results are as follows 
 
(B.14)   
) )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2
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φ φ φ φ ρ β
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(B.16) 




2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ β ρ
− − − − − − + + + − − − + = e e e k k e k k e k k e e y k  
 
Equation (B.15) is the same as Equation (3.4). Manipulation of equations (B.14) and 
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